The contents of that negotiation has always been deeply contested - the Abhisit government later claimed that the Red Shirts/UDD had stated that they would only “stop shooting at the Army”, a statement that clearly implies that the protest leaders refused to agree to unconditional peace talks.
Today we publish a memo dated 18th May 2010 - it even specifies a time frame of 630pm-815pm - which amounts to the only record of the Red Shirt/UDD and senator negotiations. This document reveals that the Red Shirts/UDD did agree to an unconditional negotiation with the Abhisit regime and, furthermore, that the senators had a form of commitment from the Abhisit regime that if the Red Shirts/UDD leadership did participate in unconditional talks, then Abhisit would suspend any further military crackdown.
What lends substantive weight to this memo is that it has been signed and certified by both a police Colonel and what we assume to be a DSI investigator. Therefore it provides the most definitive record of the senators’ negotiations with the Red Shirt/UDD leadership on May 18th 2010.
Of course, on the very next day, May 19th 2010, the Thai Army, operating under the instruction of the Abhisit regime’s orders, conducted an operation at the Wat Pathum temple which led to the deaths of six more unarmed Thai civilians.
A copy of the memo is provided below and an English translation follows.
Memo on key points and results of the negotiation between representatives of the senate and the UDD leadership.
Day: May 18, 2010
Time: 18.30-20-15
At Ratchaprasong Intersection
The senate met [held before the senators met with the UDD leadership] with the aim to find a solution to the national crisis which stemmed from the UDD protest. The chairman and first deputy chairman of the senate held discussions with pro non-violence senate group and agreed to send three representatives to meet with UDD leaderships at Ratchaprasong Intersection at 19.00 in order to hear the [negotiation] conditions and present them to the government. The senate members [of this group] preliminarily agreed that both sides must establish a ceasefire first. This proposal was put to the Prime Minister [Abhisit] at 13.30 when the chairman of the senate called and informed him. The PM didn’t oppose the proposals and asked the leader of the senate to ask the senate’s representatives to ask three questions [of the UDD leadership].
1.Can the oil truck be move from Rama IV Road?
2.Can the government be allowed to rescue the injured, children and those who want to return home?
3. What does it mean for both side to stop? Does it mean stop shooting, stop confronting or what?
At 18.30, five senate representatives, assigned by the chairman of the senate - General Lertrat Ratanavanich, Pol Lt-Gen Yutthana Thaipakdi, Wicharn Sirichai-Ekawat, Singchai Tuengthog and Narumon Siriwat - traveled to Ratchaprasong Intersection to negotiate with the UDD leadership, to ask and find out the answers for three questions on behalf of PM, to hear the negotiation conditions, to find solution for the national crisis and to them present it to PM and also to inform them that the senate believed both side should halt the confrontation and call an immediate ceasefire.
Here were the key details of the meeting between the representatives of the senate and the UDD leadership;
1.UDD leadership were not opposed to the government’s demand to move the oil truck because they didn't know who put it in the middle of the road anyway and they are happy to have the government rescue the injured in Wat Prathum.
2. UDD leadership agreed and were happy to follow the proposals to help reduce the confrontation and clashes on all sides. They proposed that the govt should withdraw the troops from the demonstration site while negotiaion was on (the govt should proceed before 12PM on May 19th, 2010 if possible).
3.UDD leadership was happy and ready to unconditionally enter into the negotiation process held by the senate with the government
4. If the negotiation was held the UDD leadership would send 2-3 of its representatives to negotiate with the government and were confident in their representatives’ decision and the UDD’s own unity.
5.If the negotiation was held, the senate members ( Pol Lt-Gen Yutthana Thaipakdi and other senate representatives who attended this meeting) would be prepared to ensure 2-3 UDD representatives’ safety and guaranteed they would not be arrested while negotiating with the government. A car would be provided.
6. When the negotiation ended and all sides were happy the UDD leadership was still concerned about the crowd dispersal process because they had to ensure the protesters understood the situation and would be calm enough before going home otherwise there may be a problem in that the protesters may not accept the negotiation result that the UDD leaderships had agreed upon - this process would likely take a bit of time.
Furthermore, one of the UDD leadership arrived at meeting (at around 19.40) and informed everyone that “tomorrow at 5AM. the army will crackdown on the protesters”. The senate representatives then expressed that in their opinion that if that was to happen, it might be the government’s tactic to just create a form of negotiation leverage. The government might intend to proceed with a further crackdown because the PM had already acknowledged and was already aware that the representative of the senate were taking part in negotiations. Also everyone hoped that if the [senate/UDD] negotiations that night reached a clear conclusion and led to a further negotiation [between the government & the UDD] the next morning with the senate as the mediator, then they would inform the Prime Minister immediately and this might help stop the government’s protest dispersal operation on the next day [19th May].
[Note - the signatories at the bottom of the document can not be accurately and fully ascertained. What can be read is “[unknown signatory] witness” and “Police Colonel [unknown signatory] investigate, record.” The document is then dated “Nov 7, 2011”. The document appears to be signed by these persons to confirm that the memo is a verified piece of evidence to be presented after that date.]
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